Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects: Causal Objections to Platonism (The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science)
| Author | : | |
| Rating | : | 4.61 (527 Votes) |
| Asin | : | 9048158362 |
| Format Type | : | paperback |
| Number of Pages | : | 240 Pages |
| Publish Date | : | 2014-06-03 |
| Language | : | English |
DESCRIPTION:
Doug Benscoter said Excellent contribution to the study of abstract objects. This is easily one of the best critiques of Platonism available today. If Cheyne's arguments are successful, by process of elimination that leaves us with either some form of nominalism (which Cheyne prefers) or conceptualism, which may have some theistic implications. Nevertheless, while I disagree with Cheyne's naturalistic explanation, I'm giving the book five stars for its thoroughness and very well constructed arguments. One of Cheyne's arguments may be summarized as follows (and this is technically my own variant of the demonstration):1. Abstract objects, such as the laws of logic, are causally inert. (Premise)"Excellent contribution to the study of abstract objects" according to Doug Benscoter. This is easily one of the best critiques of Platonism available today. If Cheyne's arguments are successful, by process of elimination that leaves us with either some form of nominalism (which Cheyne prefers) or conceptualism, which may have some theistic implications. Nevertheless, while I disagree with Cheyne's naturalistic explanation, I'm giving the book five stars for its thoroughness and very well constructed arguments. One of Cheyne's arguments may be summarized as follows (and this is technically my own variant of the demonstration):1. Abstract objects, such as the laws of logic, are causally inert. (Premise)2. In order for a. . In order for a
But abstract objects lack causal powers and a location in space and time, so how could we ever come to know of the existence of such impotent and remote objects? In Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects, Colin Cheyne presents the first systematic and detailed account of this epistemological objection to the platonist doctrine that abstract objects exist and can be known. Finally, he exposes the weaknesses of recent attempts by platonists to account for our supposed platonic knowledge. This book will be of particular interest to researchers and advanced students of epistemology and of the philosophy of mathematics and science. He also concentrates on our knowledge of what exists, and argues for a causal constraint on such existential knowledge. Since mathematics has such a central role in the acquisition of scientific knowledge, he concentrates on mathematical platonism. According to platonists, entities such as numbers, sets, propositions and properties are abstract objects. It will also be of interest to all philosophers with a general interest in metaphysics and ontology.